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Abstract
We model the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated
duopoly. We extend the literature in determining the standard endogenously, showing
that the maximisation of social welfare entails an increase in the surplus accruing to
consumers served by the low quality firm and a decrease in the surplus of the remaining
consumers. Then, we consider the effects of the standard on the stability of price
collusion, proving that the standard makes it more difficult for firms to collude if
consumers are sufficiently rich.
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21. Introduction
The regulation of an imperfectly competitive market with vertically differentiated
products has been long debated in the literature since the seminal contributions of Spence
(1975) and Sheshinski (1976). More recently, various papers have examined the
consequences of the adoption of a minimum quality standard in oligopolistic markets
where each firm supplies at least one variety (see, among others, Besanko et al.,1987 and
1988; Ronnen, 1991 and Crampes and Hollander, 1995). Both Ronnen (1991) and
Crampes and Hollander (1995) consider a duopolistic market with single-product firms.
The introduction of the minimum quality standard is then analysed as an exogenous
constraint on the low quality firm to increase its quality level. The introduction of the
standard gives a strategic advantage and higher profits to the low quality firm and
reduces the degree of differentiation in the market. Although the standard exerts a
positive welfare effect, its consequences, as far as consumers’ surplus is concerned, are
quite different depending on the cost functions of firms. Ronnen adopts a model where
the provision of quality entails only a fixed cost for firms: in this case, all consumers
benefit from the standard because the price-cost margin is reduced. Crampes and
Hollander show that the same result holds in a model where variable costs depend on
both quality and quantity, provided that the standard reduces the degree of differentiation
sufficiently. Otherwise, only the consumers served by the low quality firm benefit from
the standard, although social welfare always increases1. In both papers, the adoption of
the standard entails a reduction of product differentiation in the market and an
asymmetric change in firms’ profits. This raises the question of whether firms could find
it easier to collude in presence of a standard.
There are several contributions dealing with price collusion in endogenously
differentiated product settings (see, for instance, Chang, 1991; Ross, 1992 and Friedman
and Thisse, 1993). They mainly consider horizontal differentiation models showing that
the stability of collusion increases as the degree of product differentiation increases. In
this case, the symmetry of the models implies that as the degree of substitutability
decreases, the gain associated with deviation from the cartel agreement decreases as
well. To our knowledge, the only paper investigating the issue of cartel stability in a
vertically differentiation setting is that of Haeckner (1994). He analyses the stability of
                                               
1
 For an analysis of the strategic role of quality standards in an international oligopolistic setting, see
Motta and Thisse, 1993, and Boom, 1995.
3collusion in a model of endogenous vertical differentiation using a framework à la
Shaked and Sutton (1982). He shows that price collusion is more easily sustained the
closer the products are in the quality range. This is due to the fact that, with vertical
differentiation, the punishment phase introduces an asymmetry in cartel behaviour which
is absent in the horizontal differentiation models à la Hotelling (see Chang, 1991).
In this paper, we extend the previous literature in two directions. First, we
endogenise explicitly the choice of the minimum quality standard which maximises social
welfare. Second, we consider the possibility that the reduction of product differentiation
due to the standard may trigger collusive behaviours between firms in order to safeguard
profits. We model a duopoly market à la Mussa-Rosen (1978) where firms produce only
one variety and production involves variable costs convex in quality and an exogenous
fixed cost. We show that the endogenous choice of the standard increases social welfare
so that the gains for the low quality firm and low income consumers outweigh the losses
suffered by the high quality firm and high income consumers. Moreover, we prove that
the adoption of the standard makes it more difficult for firms to collude in prices, if
consumers are sufficiently rich. This shows that the minimum quality standard, in
addition to welfare gains, provides also pro-competitive benefits in the long-run.
The paper is organised as follows. Section two presents the basic model and
describes the duopoly and monopoly equibria without the minimum quality standard. The
endogenous choice of the minimum quality and its effects are presented in section three.
Section four deals with price collusion. Section five contains some final remarks.
2. The model
2.1 Assumptions and notation
We consider a market for vertically differentiated products. There is a continuum of
consumers whose types are identified by θ, uniformly distributed in the interval [a,b],
with a=b-1 and b≥5/42. The parameter θ represents consumers’ marginal willingness to
pay for quality. Each consumer is assumed to buy one unit of the vertically differentiated
good in order to maximise the following indirect utility function:
U = θ q - p (1)
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 This condition ensures the existence of the duopoly equilibrium (see Cremer and Thisse (1994) on this
point).
4where q indicates the quality of the product and p is the market price at which that
variety is supplied. In other terms, we assume full market coverage. This assumption can
be justified by envisaging a paternalistic public agency which imposes firms to guarantee
universal service.
The production technology involves variable costs which are convex in quality
and linear in quantity and a sunk cost k, related to the development of the product. The
corresponding cost function is defined as:
C = t q2 x + k , t>0  (2)
where x denotes the output level. We also assume that k is sufficiently small to allow for
strictly positive profits for firms active in the market.
We suppose that only two qualities (which we indicate as high and low) are
supplied in the market, with qH> qL. Hence θi, the index of the consumer indifferent
between the two varieties, is defined as
θi = (pH - pL)/(qH - qL) (3)
So that market demand for the two varieties are
xH = b- θi (4a)
xL = θi - a (4b)
2.2 Duopoly equilibrium
We first take into account a duopoly market where each firm supplies a single quality.
Competition takes place in two stages. In the first, firms choose qualities and in the
second they compete in prices. The solution concept applied is the subgame perfect
equilibrium by backward induction.
The profit function of firm i is defined as3
pii = (pi - t qi2) xi ; i= H,L (5)
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 For simplicity of notation, henceforth we shall consider firms’ profits gross of fixed costs k.
5In the second stage, firms choose prices to maximise profits, given the quality levels set
in the first stage. The corresponding first order conditions for a maximum are4
δpiH / δpH = (pL -2pH +bqH - bqL + t qH2 )/ (qH - qL) =0 (6a)
δpiL / δpL = (pH -2pL +qH - bqH  - qL+bqL + t qL2 )/ (qH - qL) =0 (6b)
Then, the resulting equilibrium prices are
pHN= (qH + bqH  - qL - bqL+ 2t qH2 + tqL2)/3 (7a)
pLN = ( 2qH - bqH  - 2qL - bqL+ t qH2 + 2tqL2)/3 (7b)
where the superscript N stands for Nash equilibrium.
Substituting the equilibrium prices in the profit functions of the firms we can
obtain the following equilibrium quality levels for the two firms
qHN= (4b + 1)/ 8t (8a)
qLN = (4b -5)/8t (8b)
Since the duopoly is symmetric, demands are both equal to 1/2. The corresponding
profits amount to piiN = 3/16t ; i= H,L (see Cremer and Thisse (1994)).
For future reference, it is also convenient to calculate the social welfare
corresponding to the duopoly equilibrium. Assuming a benevolent social planner, her
utilitarian social welfare function, defined as the sum of consumer and producer surplus,
can be written as
( ) ( )W q tq d q tq dL L
a
i
H H
i
b
= − + −∫ ∫θ θ θ θ2 2 (9)
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 In this case, as in the rest of the paper, we do not present the second order conditions for optima,
which, however, can be shown to hold throughout.
6The welfare level corresponding to the duopoly equilibrium is WN = (16b2 -16b -1)/64t.
In addition, we can also calculate the consumer surplus for the two segments of the
market, which are, respectively, CSLN=(16b2-24b-19)/(128t) and CSHN=(16b2-8b-
27)/(128t).
2.3 Monopoly
Consider now the case of a private monopolist producing two varieties. The profits of
the monopolist are defined as:
piM = (pH - t qH2) xH  + (pL - t qL2) xL (10)
The monopolist chooses prices to maximise profits, under the assumption that all the
consumers must be served. Thus, monopoly prices (see Mussa and Rosen (1978); Itoh,
(1983)) are:
pLM = (b-1) qL (11a)
pHM= (bqH - 2qL + bqL + t qH2 - tqL2)/2 (11b)
The qualities result qLM=(2b-3)/4t and qHM=(2b -1)/4t; the monopolist’s profits are equal
to piM= (4b2 - 8b +5)/16t.The corresponding level of social welfare is WM = (4b2 -4b -
3)/16t.
It can be quickly verified that the profit maximising monopolist distorts quality
levels as compared to a social optimum5. In fact, the social planner would choose the
quality levels in order to maximise (9). The resulting qualities would be qLSP = (4b - 3)
/8t and qH SP= (4b -1) /8t and the corresponding level of social welfare would be equal to
WSP = (16b2 -16b +5)/64t.
3. The introduction of a minimum quality standard
Suppose that a public authority intervenes to regulate the behaviour of firms as far as
their quality choice is concerned, by introducing a minimum quality standard6. The social
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 For a seminal discussion of this point, see Spence (1975).
6
 In order to induce the low quality firm to adhere to the standard, we can assume that the authority
introduces a penalty which makes convenient to the firm to set a quality level equal to the standard.
7planner sets the standard in order to maximise social welfare, taking duopolistic price
competition as given. Thus, the minimum quality standard chosen by the social planner
will satisfy the first order condition
δW
 
/ δqL = (14b -8 -5b2  -28 tqL -20 tqL + 5t2qH2 - 10t2 qH qL -15t2 qL2 )/ 18 =0 (12)
while the high quality firms will simultaneously set its quality level in order to maximise
profits, so that
δpiH / δqH = (1 + b -tqH - tqL ) (1 + b -3tqH + tqL) /9 =0 (13)
The solution of the social planner’s maximisation problem is given by
qLS = (20b - 34 + 9 √6)/40t (14)
which corresponds to the minimum quality standard7, whereas the quality set by the high
quality firm is
qHS= (20b + 2 + 3√6)/40t (15)
It is easy to see that the introduction of the minimum quality standard increases the levels
of quality produced in the market, that is qLS is greater than qL and qHS is greater than qH.
Since the minimum quality standard is higher than the lower quality previously offered in
the market in absence of regulation, the high quality firm increases its quality level since
qualities are strategic complements (see Crampes and Hollander 1995, Bulow et
al.1985). The effect of the standard on the degree of differentiation in the market is
summarised in the following fact.
Fact 1: the setting of the minimum quality standard decreases the degree of
differentiation in the market.
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 Crampes and Hollander (1995, p.76) state that setting a quality standard is equivalent to granting the
low quality firm the ability to commit in quality. In fact, it  can be shown that the standard is slighly
lower than the quality chosen by a firms acting as a Stackelberg leader in the quality stage of the game.
8Using (8a,b) and (14-15), it is immediate to verify that (qHS - qLS) is smaller than (qHN -
qLN).
The quantities produced by the low and the high quality firms are, respectively,
xH
S
= (6√6 - 21)/ (5√6 - 30) ≅  0.355051 (16a)
xL
S
= (9+√6)/ (30 -5√6 ) ≅ 0.644949 (16b)
The effect of the introduction of the minimum quality standard on the market shares of
the two firms is summarised in the following fact.
Fact 2: the presence of the minimum quality standard reduces the demand for the high
quality good while increasing demand for the low quality good.
The corresponding profits for the firms are8
piL
S
= (54√6 + 261)/ 500t √6 (1- √6) ≅ 0.22153/t (17a)
piH
S
= (756√6 - 1971)/ 500t √6 (1- √6) ≅ 0.06714/t (17b)
Fact 3: the introduction of the quality standard increases the profits of the low quality
firm and decreases the profits of the high quality firm due to the reduction of the degree
of differentiation between products in equilibrium.
It is also worth noting that total industry profits after the introduction of the minimum
quality standard are smaller than total profits in the duopoly equilibrium without
standard9.
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 It is easy to verify that the optimal quality choice for the low quality firm under the constraint
represented by the standard coincides indeed with the latter, since both the first and the second
derivatives of its profit function with respect to qL are negative in correspondence of the minimum
quality standard.
9The level of social welfare is
WS= 
(42000b2+12000√6+12000b√6-42000b+4560√6-9210)
(48000t(7/2+√6)) (18)
Fact 4: the introduction of the quality standard increases social welfare compared to the
duopoly equilibrium.
It is immediate to show that WS is greater than WN. The increase in social welfare is due
to: a) an increase in the level of qualiy of both goods produced; b) an increase in price
competition between the two firms, since the difference (qHS-qLS) is smaller than the
corresponding difference (qHN-qLN) in the duopoly equilibrium. Moreover, the increase in
social welfare is due to the fact that the introduction of the standard entails an increase in
consumer surplus that outweighs the decrease in total industry profits. However, the
effect of the standard on consumers’ surplus is different across consumers, as stated in
the following fact.
Fact 5: the introduction of the quality standard always increases the surplus accruing to
consumers who purchase the low quality good while it decreases the surplus for the
consumers served by the high quality firm for b sufficiently high.
This is immediate from a straightforward comparison between the equilibrium levels of
the consumers’ surplus in the two settings (see appendix B).
4. Price collusion
In this section we consider collusive behaviour in the market stage of the game, with and
without minimum quality standard. In such a setting, qualities are still set non-
cooperatively by firms. This assumption can be justified on the grounds of the fact that
quality choices can be interpreted as long-run commitments for firms and thus it would
be too difficult for them to reach an agreement in both stages of the game. The price
setting behaviour of the cartel is analogous to that of a profit-seeking monopolist as
shown in section 2.3.
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 From equation (24b), it emerges that the sunk cost k must be not greater than 0.06714/t. In fact, if
k=0.06714/t, only two firms can operate in the market when a minimum quality standard is present.
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In order to measure the stability of collusion, we can resort, as usual, to the
definition of critical discount factor, that is
αi
*
 = (piiD - piiC) / (piiD  - piiN ); i=H,L (19)
where piiN indicates firm i’s non-cooperative profits; piiC indicates firm i’s collusive profits
and finally piiD denotes firm i’s profits from deviation from the price cartel. The stability
of the cartel requires that both firms’ discount factors are greater than the critical value
defined in (19). Cartel profits are determined according to the Nash bargaining solution
which establishes that the total increase in profit with respect to the non-cooperative
equilibrium is equally divided between firms10. Thus, for each firm, we obtain
 pii
C
 = pii
N 
 + (ΠC  - piiN - pijN)/2;  i,j =H,L , i≠j (20)
where ΠC indicates total cartel profits. Deviation profits, denoted by piiD, obtain by
calculating the optimal deviation price for firm i when firm j remains loyal to the price
agreement.
4.1 Collusion without minimum quality standard
We can first consider the case where firms collude in prices without the minimum quality
standard. The global profits accruing to the cartel are ΠC  = (8b2 -16b +9)/32t. Given the
symmetry of the model, piiC= ΠC/2. On the basis of equations (6a,b) and (11a,b) it can be
established that deviation leads to the following pairs of prices and profits for the low
and the high quality firm, respectively:
pLD= (48b2 - 112b +101)/128t (21a)
pHD= (48b2 - 16b +41)/128t (21b)
piL
D
= (16b2 -32b +51)2 /12288t (22a)
piH
D
= (16b2 -32b +39)2 /12288t (22b)
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 For a seminal treatment of sharing rule of cartel profits in asymmetric settings, see Friedman (1977).
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We can now calculate the critical discount factors for the two firms without minimum
quality standard:
αL*= 
(873-192b+1120b2-1024b3+256b4)
(297-3264b+2656b2-1024b3+256b4) (23)
In order to ensure that αL*∈[0,1] it is necessary that b ≥ 2.61962.
αH*= 
(-207+576b+736b2-1024b3+256b4)
(-783-2496b+2272b2-1024b3+256b4) (24)
Similarly, it can be easily shown that αH*∈[0,1] if b ≥ 1.90139. In the interval
[2.61962,∞[, both αi* are increasing and concave in b.
4.2 Collusion with minimum quality standard
In the case of the minimum quality standard, we can calculate cartel and deviation profits
for the two firms, following the same procedure shown above.
Collusive profits amount to, respectively,
piL
CS
 = 
(109206-42966√6+84000b-24000b√6-42000b2+12000b2√6)
(48000t(7+2√6)) (25)
piH
CS
= 
(-172458+60138√6+84000b-24000b√6-42000b2+12000b2√6)
(48000t(7+2√6)) (26)
and deviation profits are
piL
DS
=(190953+59292√6-146400b-129600b√6+233200b2+64800b2√6-160000b3+
+40000b4)/ (384000t√6(√6-1)) (27)
piH
DS 
=(631777-242172√6+520800b+148800b√6+420400b2-74400b2√6-
160000b3+40000b4)/(384000t√6(√6-1)) (28)
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Using the previous expressions, we can calculate the critical discount factors αiS* (the
expressions are presented in appendix C). In order to ensure that αLS*∈[0,1] it is
necessary that b ≥ 1.25. Analogously, αHS*∈[0,1] if b ≥ 3.26553, so that in the interval
[3.26553,∞[ both αiS* are increasing and concave in b. The effect of the introduction of
the minimum quality standard on the critical discount factors and thus on the stability of
the cartel is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: the introduction of the minimum quality standard makes collusive
agreement more difficult to sustain as compared to the duopoly without standard.
Proof: simple numerical calculations show that αHS*>αH* for b>4.52953. This implies
that if b is sufficiently high, the introduction of the minimum quality standard makes it
more difficult for the high quality firm to stick to the cartel agreement. On the other
hand, it is easily seen that αLS*>αL* for all b>3.26553, implying that for the low quality
firm it is always more difficult to collude after the introduction of the standard. This
entails that cartel stability is reduced by the introduction of the minimum quality
standard. 
This result is in line with the findings of Chang (1991) in a model of horizontal
differentiation with quadratic transportation costs11. The difference in the critical
discount factors for the two firms can be justified by the asymmetry in non-cooperative
profits induced by the standard in favour of the low quality firm.
The behaviour of the critical discount factors in the two setting for each firm are
represented in figures 1 and 2.
[Insert figure 1 about here]
[Insert figure 2 about here]
5. Concluding remarks
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 As shown by Cremer and Thisse (1991), the Hotelling model with convex transportation costs is a
special case of a vertical differentiation model with convex variable production costs.
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In this paper we have considered a model of duopoly à la Mussa-Rosen where firms
produce only one variety and production involves variable costs convex in quality and an
exogenous fixed cost. Building on the work of Crampes and Hollander (1995), we have
considered the endogeneous setting of a minimum quality standard by a benevolent
regulator aiming at maximising social welfare. In line with the previous literature, we
have shown that the introduction of the standard (i) decreases the degree of
differentiation in the market; (ii) reduces the market share of the high quality firm to the
advantage of the low quality firm; (iii) increases social welfare in a way that the gains for
the low quality firm and low income consumers outweigh the losses suffered by the high
quality firm and high income consumers. We have also studied the effect of the
introduction of the standard on the stability of collusion in the market stage of the game.
In this respect, we have proved that the presence of the standard makes it more difficult
for firms to collude in prices, if consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for quality is
sufficiently high. The reduction of cartel stability is due to the decrease of product
differentiation which entails a higher incentive to deviate for both firms, although the
asymmetry produced by the standard makes deviation more likely for the low quality
firm. This final result is interesting in showing that the minimum quality standard, in
addition to static welfare gains, yields also pro-competitive effects in the long-run.
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Appendix A
In this appendix we will show that the level of social welfare corresponding to the
introduction of the minimum quality standard, denoted by WS, cannot be increased if the
social planner acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the high quality firm in setting
the minimum quality standard. In that case, the social planner would maximise (9) with
respect to qL, taking into account the reaction function of the high quality firm, which
corresponds to
qH= qL/3  + (1+3b)/3t (A.1)
The first order condition for a maximum would be defined as
δW/δqL = (130b -73 -40b2  -260 tqL +160 btqL + 160 t2qL2)/ 162 =0 (A.2)
and the resulting minimum quality standard would be
qLSS = (40b - 65 + 3√145)/80t (A.3)
where superscript SS indicates the minimum quality standard that maximises social
welfare when the social planner mimics the behaviour of a Stackelberg leader.
Using (A.1), we can calculate the corresponding level of social welfare:
WSS= 
(47780√145-451900-1972800b+100800b√145+1972800b2-100800b2√145)
t(7891200-403200√145) (A.4)
It is then immediate to show that WS> WSS and that the difference (WS- WSS) is convex
in b.
17
Appendix B
In this appendix, we show the consumer surplus levels in presence of the minimum
quality standard
CSLS= 
(-22944+6309√6-15720b+1920b√6+9600b2-600b2√6)
24000t(7-2√6) (B.1)
CSHS= 
(-127098+49803√6-26280b+10080b√6+32400b2-11400b2√6)
24000t(7-2√6) (B.2)
It is then immediate to verify that CSHS- CSHN<0 for b∈]2.219,∞[, while CSLS- CSLN>0
for all admissible values of b.
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Appendix C
In this appendix the critical discount factors in presence of minimum quality standards
are displayed:
αL
S
*=(542042982-217073952√6+415569600b-170985600b√6-137704800b2+
58612800b2√6-70080000b3+26880000b3√6+17520000b4-6720000b4√6)/
(66499686-20330496√6+66513600b-32169600b√6+36832300b2-
10795200b2√6-70080000b3+26880000b3√6+17520000b4-6720000b4√6)
(C.1)
αH
S
*=(-255433770+101016720√6-29044800b+13852800b√6+84602400b2-
33806400b2√6-70080000b3+26880000b3√6+17520000b4-6720000b4√6)/
(-727613226+296469936√6-378100800b+152668800b√6+259130400b2-
103214400b2√6-70080000b3+26880000b3√6+17520000b4-6720000b4√6)
(C.2)
